I. Introduction
Since the eruption of the global financial crisis in 2008 international setting bodies and local regulators around the world have been hard at work designing and implementing new regulatory frameworks to deal with the regulatory deficiencies that were exposed during the crisis. In particular, there is now a consensus that existing regulations in developed countries
were not able to contain excessive risk-taking activities by financial institutions in this group of countries during the pre-crisis period. 1 Among these regulations, the newly proposed set of reform measures developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS): "Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems" (2011) is perhaps the one that has attracted most attention worldwide because a central focus of the recommendations lies on important changes in banks' regulatory capital requirements. Although there is recognition that the proposed reforms will contribute to global financial stability, there is also a heated debate in developed countries between regulators, representative from financial institutions and academicians regarding the macroeconomic impact from complying with Basel III in the proposed time frame advanced by the BCBS. 2 While some analysts claim that in the transition to Basel III banks may raise significantly their lending rates and reduce their lending activities, others argue that these effects will be of small magnitude.
Where does Latin America stand with respect to capital requirements? Can banks in the region satisfy with ease the new capital requirements of Basel III or will the implementation of this new set of capital recommendations require large efforts from banks in the region?
This paper deals with these questions for the case of four Andean countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. 3 There are two key reasons for tackling this issue: The first is based on a presumption and relates to the strong performance of the region's financial systems as a whole, and the Andean countries in particular, during the global financial crisis.
The fact that no major financial disruption took place in the region is an indicator of adequate level of banks' capitalization resulting from earlier (pre-global crisis) financial sector reforms (involving both regulation and supervision). As such, one would expect that banks in the region would not require large efforts to meet the demands from a new regulatory framework aiming at improve banks' capitalization. This presumption, however, needs to be tested against the data.
The second reason, closely related to the first, involves the issues raised in developed countries regarding the effects on banks' lending and banks' lending rates of raising additional capital. If banks in the Andean countries need to significantly raise more capital to satisfy Basel III requirements, there would be a strong basis to request further investigation about the possible impacts of implementing the new Accord in the region.
To deal with the questions posed above, the rest of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II sets up the context of the analysis by relating the most important conceptual changes in capital requirements under Basel III to the new approach to macro prudential regulation. This section also briefly summarizes the definitional and numerical changes in capital requirements under Basel III. Section IV, the core of the paper, compares actual holdings of banks' regulatory capital in the four countries under study with hypothetical calculations of regulatory capital under compliance with Basel III. In doing so, the exercise in this section allows to identify for each country: (a) whether banks would have to raise large amounts of capital to meet Basel III requirements and (b) the sources (if any) of major gaps between actual capital and regulatory capital under Basel III. Finally, Section V concludes the note.
II. New Capital Requirements Under Basel III
As a starting point, it is important to understand the analytical framework that led to changes from Basel II to Basel III. In a nutshell, changes in Basel III were based on the recognition that a micro prudential approach to capital requirements needed to be complemented with macro prudential recommendations. This section relates changes in capital requirements under Basel III with the new approach to macro prudential regulation. The section also summarizes Basel III's most important definitions of capital and its numerical requirements.
A. Basel III and the New Approach to Macro Prudential Regulation
As explained in Galindo and Rojas-Suarez (2010) micro prudential regulation is based on the view that banks need to correctly assess the risks that they are taking on their individual balance sheets. Under this view, the regulatory framework is based on indicators that reflect the financial soundness of the individual financial institutions and requires banks to build buffers against expected and unexpected shocks. A key buffer is the degree of bank capitalization, measured over the last decade as the risk-weighted capital asset ratio as defined in Basel II.
In contrast, the macro prudential approach focuses on minimizing the macroeconomic costs of financial disruptions. In particular it aims to limit the eruption of credit crunches derived from a systemic banking crisis, which in turn leads to contractions in economic growth. Under this view, aggregate risk depends on the collective behavior of financial institutions and not just on the activities of individual firms. As summarized by Borio (2009) the macro prudential approach has two dimensions: (a) a cross-sectional dimension which derives from common exposures across financial institutions (either because they are directly exposed to the same kind of asset classes or because of linkages and interconnections between institutions); and (b) a time dimension which results from the evolution of risk during the economic cycle. That is, in good times perceptions of risk tend to be low which induce excessive increases in banks' risk-taking activities and the formation of unsustainable credit expansions. As the economic cycle peaks and economic activity slows down, the process reverses, leading to financial stresses and the potential severe contraction of bank credit, which reinforces the economic downturn. This is what is known as the pro-cyclicality of bank credit.
What does the emphasis on a macro prudential approach mean for capital requirements under Basel III? It has two central implications: (a) the quality and not just the quantity of capital matters and (b) capital requirements need to have a time-varying component. We now explain each of these two implications in turn.
(a) The quality (and not just the quantity) of capital matters Basel III defines the highest "quality capital" as common shares and retained earnings since this is the type of capital that can best absorb losses. As will be shown below, relative to Basel II, Basel III significantly increases requirements of this type of capital.
Based on our discussion above, the emphasis of Basel III on high quality capital is fully consistent with the macro prudential approach. To illustrate this point, consider capital requirements under Basel II. There, the recommendation is for banks to hold a minimum capital to risk-weighted assets ratio of 8 percent at all times. At times of financial stress, when increases in risk lead to deterioration in asset quality and, therefore, a reduction in capital, banks are required to restore their capital ratios. Since the emphasis is on the capital ratio, banks have a strong incentive to comply with the regulatory requirements by reducing assets (i.e., reducing credit and/or selling assets) rather than by increasing capital, which is very costly at times of large financial uncertainties (see Hanson et al, 2011) . Thus, complying with Basel II requirements might actually reinforce credit crunches in bad times. This directly conflicts with the objectives of macro prudential regulation.
As stated by Hanson et al (2011) , banks' incentives can be modified if the definition of regulatory capital is made very stringent such that stocks senior to common shares are not included (or are drastically limited). The reasoning is that if part of capital is formed by senior stocks, such as preferred stocks, it will be very hard for banks to raise common shares at times of stress since investors would perceive that the new equity will be used to bail out the position of the more senior preferred investors.
Thus, by requiring banks to hold most of its capital in the form of common shares and retained earnings, Basel III makes it relative easier for banks to raise common shares capital during "bad times".
(b) Capital requirements need to have a time-varying component
While the improvements in the definition of "what constitutes regulatory capital" certainly reduce the probability of credit crunches, such changes cannot fully prevent the eruption of severe credit contraction and, therefore, cannot be enough to reach the macro prudential goals. This is because in bad times, the increase in overall risk aversion is usually reflected in a significant reduction in the demand for all types of equity. in the credit markets (see discussion above). The conservation buffer has been set at 2.5 percent of RWA (risk-weighted assets) and the countercyclical buffer has been set as a range between 0 and 2.5 percent of RWA.
-Most capital (minimum and buffers) will need to be formed by the highest quality capital (common shares and retained earnings). In particular, out of the 8 percent minimum capital ratio, 4.5 percent will need to be formed by high quality capital. This is in contrast with Basel II where this ratio needs to reach only 2 percent. Only high quality capital qualifies as capital in both the conservation and countercyclical buffers.
-In addition to common shares and retained earnings, 3/Scenario 1 assumes that donations are permanent and therefore they can be used to meet losses; 100% of the previous years' net profits have a formal agreement for capitalization; and the net profits from current year included in the regulatory capital, according to the current legislation, will be effectively capitalized. Scenario 2 assumes that none of these sources are converted into equity capital. 4/Scenario 1 assumes that 100% of the current year's net profits have an agreement for capitalization while scenario 2 assumes that 100% of net profits can be distributed. 5/Current Peruvian legislation includes a Tier 3 capital, mainly composed by subordinated claims with 2 to 5 years to maturity. For presentation purposes, these claims are included in Tier 2 Capital. all countries would maintain capital to RWA ratios on or above 10.5 percent, which includes the 2.5 percent conservation buffer (see Table 1 ). 8 Even more important, all countries would hold Tier 1 capital to RWA ratios way above the required 8.5 percent under Basel III.
In the cases of Bolivia and Peru, the capital losses implied by compliance with BIII are very small and do no result in changes in the capital ratios. In Peru, adjustments to meet BIII capital requirements mostly result in a re-composition of capital between Tier 1 and Tier 2 levels.
In the cases of Colombia and Ecuador, the information available imposes some constraints to the exercise conducted in this section. Specifically, it is not clear which part of the current and previous years' net income has a capitalization agreement. Therefore, it is not
possible to determine what component of these items can be considered as regulatory capital under BIII. To surpass this limitation, we present two scenarios. Scenario 1 assumes that 100% of net profits have agreements for capitalization and could be included in the regulatory capital. In contrast, scenario 2 assumes that 100% of net profits can be distributed and should not be included as part of regulatory capital. This approach makes it possible to identify a range for capital adjustments needed to meet BIII. In Colombia, independently of whether net profits count with capitalization agreements, there would be a reduction in the capital ratio that would, in turn, be the highest among the countries in the sample (between 2.1 and 2.3 percent). In the case of Ecuador, the presence (or lack) of net profits capitalization agreements makes a significant difference in the results. Based on the two alternative scenarios, the resulting reduction in regulatory capital would fluctuate between 0.6 and 2.4 percent of risk-weighted assets.
The following discussion and tables present in more detail the deductions to the existing regulatory capital of each country to meet the BIII recommendations 9 .
Bolivia is the only country in the sample where we were not able to fully reconcile capital reported by the national regulatory agency (11.89% of risk-weighted assets) with capital calculated by its components based on available information (11.98% of risk-weighted assets). However, because the difference is very small, it does not affect the conclusions from the analysis.
10
As shown in Table 3 , the only adjustment needed in Bolivia relates to the item on donations. The general principles guiding the computation of capital under Basel III imply that donations can be included as part of regulatory capital only if they are fully capitalized.
In Bolivia, however, donations registered as regulatory capital are freely distributable and hence should not be included under BIII. Since this component accounts for only 0.01% of the risk-weighted assets, regulatory capital does not change significantly after deducting donations. Nevertheless, a note of caution is that current legislation does not consider most of the deductions that Basel III recommends to apply to Tier 1 capital (goodwill, cash flow hedge reserves, investments in own shares, among others). However, we were not able to deduct these items since there is not available information to quantify them. In other words, there is a risk that we could be underestimating deductions in a significant manner.
9 Additional details about the components of current Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, and the required adjustments to meet BIII criteria, are shown in Appendix 1. However, given the specificities used by each country to define its regulatory capital, tables are presented in Spanish. 10 The difference is attributed to capital deductions for which no information is available. They include deficits in provisioning requirements, improperly registered income and non-registered expenses. Among countries in the sample, Colombia is the one most subject to adjustments (Table   4) . Currently, deferred tax assets are not deducted from Tier 1 capital. Given their reliance on future profitability, BIII recommends to deduct this item from the computation of Tier 1 capital. However, this component only accounts for 0.33 percent of risk-weighted assets.
Since we do not have detailed information on donations and net profits intended to be capitalized, we construct two scenarios, one assuming full capitalization and another assuming no capitalization. In any case, the values of these components are so small that their deduction does not significantly affect core capital. Therefore, in the worst case scenario (no capitalization of donations and net profits) the reduction in the Tier 1 capital that would result from adopting the BIII criteria would be only 0.47 percent of risk-weighted assets.
Most of the required adjustment falls on Tier 2 capital. Particularly, regulations in Colombia allows for the inclusion as banks' capital of: (a) adjustments for assets' inflation, (b) unrealized profits from investment in unrestricted securities, and (c) revaluation of assets like equipment, art and cultural goods. According to BIII, the first of these components
should not count as capital, and the other two do not fulfill the requirement of either ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- continuance or the capacity to absorb losses that regulatory capital must fulfill. Together, these three components currently account for 1.8 percent of risk-weighted asset. As a result, the required adjustment to meet BIII criteria would imply an overall capital ratio reduction which fluctuates between 2.11 percent and 2.26 percent. Table 4 . Colombia -Adjustments to meet the Basel III Capital Agreement n.a. = non-available information 1/Other assets' revaluations should not be included as regulatory capital according to Basel III because they arise from tangible real estate, equipment, art and cultural goods. 2/Scenario 1 assumes that donations are permanent and therefore they can absorb losses; 100% of the previous years' net profits have a formal agreement for capitalization and net profits from current year included in the regulatory capital according to the current legislation will be effectively capitalized. Scenario 2 assumes that none of these income sources are converted into shares.
In Ecuador, the current legislation allows for the inclusion of reserves for future capitalization in Tier 1 capital, even though there is no agreement to turn them into shares.
However, these reserves do not represent an important share of Tier 1 capital, leading to a reduction of only 0.22 percent of capital to risk-weighted assets if these type reserves are deducted to meet the BIII inclusion criteria for Tier 1. In addition to these reserves, there are other components that the present legislation includes in Tier 1 and do not meet BIII's recommendations. However, these components, which are constituted by donations and subordinated debt that do not meet the inclusion criteria, are currently equal to zero and would not imply additional adjustments (Table 5) . As in Colombia, most of the required adjustment would take place in Tier 2 capital. In the existing legislation, this level of regulatory capital can include items without capitalization agreements, such as some reserves, securities with the option but not the requirement to be converted into shares, and previous years' net profits, as well as subordinated debt with less than 5 year to maturity. These components do not meet the BIII inclusion criteria and would lead to a reduction in capital of 0.09% of risk-weighted assets. Most of the adjustment would depend on the portion of the current year's net profits that is committed for conversion into shares; but current legislation does not provide information on that. If there is full capitalization, the total reduction in the capital ratio would be 0.6 percent. If no profits are converted into shares, then the total adjustment in the capital ratio would be of 2.4 percent, higher than in the case of Colombia under the same scenario. As a result, even when it is evident that there are a number of components that would need to be deducted from Tier 2 capital to meet BIII, it is not clear how large some of these components are and therefore what the overall capital adjustment would need to be. 
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IV. Concluding Remarks
The analysis on capital held by banks in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru brings good news: While capital would decline somewhat in these Andean countries (values in all countries and ratios in some) after adjustments for compliance with the definition of capital under Basel III, all countries would still meet Basel III recommendations on banks' capital.
Specifically, all countries would maintain capital to risk-weighted-assets ratios on or above 10.5 percent, which includes the 2.5 percent conservation buffer. Even more important, all countries would hold Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted-asset ratios way above the required 8.5
percent under Basel III. In a nutshell, not only the quantity, but also the quality of capital is adequate in the countries included in this study and this is consistent with the macroprudential approach to financial regulation.
Stock Sep 2011 (MM. Soles)
Capital to RWA (%) 
= Patrimonio Neto Total 5 634
Inversiones en empresas de servicios financieros, burós de información crediticia, cámaras de compensación, sociedades de titularización, administradoras de fondos de pensiones, bancos de segundo piso o sociedades de propiedad mayoritaria que no sean consolidadas 1/ No se cuenta con detalle de donaciones. Se asume que el total es de carácter permanente. 2/ No se cuenta información sobre la proporción de los resultados de ejercicios anteriores capitalizados, por lo que se supone un nivel igual al que permite alcanzar el total de capital primario reportado por la Superintendencia. 3/ Se supone que el capital garantía cumple con el programa. 4/ Se supone que 0% de los activos han sido enajenados 5/ Se supone que el 100% de las desvalorizaciones corresponden al Capital de Nivel 2, y por tanto se descuentan. 6/ Se supone que 100% del stock cumple con los requerimientos para ser incluido en el Capital de Nivel 2. 
COLOMBIA I. Cuentas incluidas en el capital regulador según legislación vigente
